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In this paper I present an argument for a rational norm involving quantificational credences. To 
support this norm, I prove a result called a Dutch Book Theorem. In order to prove the result, I 
introduce the novel concept of a quantificational bet. I also undertake a discussion of Dutch Book 
Theorems in general and remark on the similarities and differences between the Dutch Book 
Theorem for quantificational credences and Dutch Book Theorems for norms on ordinary and 
conditional credences. Overall, the discussion of the norm on quantificational credences gives us 
a fuller picture of the normative landscape of credal states. 
 
1. Introduction 
 This paper’s focus is a rational norm involving a kind of credal attitude called a 
quantificational credence1—the kind of attitude we can report by saying that Lucy thinks that 
each record in Schroeder’s collection is 5% likely to be scratched. I prove a result called a Dutch 
Book Theorem, which constitutes conditional support for the norm. Though Dutch Book 
Theorems exist for norms on ordinary and conditional credences, there is controversy about the 
epistemic significance of these results. So, my conclusion is that if Dutch Book Theorems do, in 
general, support norms on credal states, then we have support for the suggested norm on 
quantificational credences. Providing conditional support for this norm gives us a fuller picture of 
the normative landscape of credal states. 
 There is another important upshot of my result. It gives us a better picture of the ways in 
which quantificational credences are similar to and distinct from widely accepted credal attitudes 
—ordinary and conditional credences. On one hand, featuring in a Dutch Book Theorem is an 
interesting point in common between quantificational credences and these more standard credal 
attitudes. On the other hand, a kind of bet at play in proving the Dutch Book Theorem involving 
quantificational credences—what I call a quantificational bet—is distinct from ordinary and 
conditional bets (or combinations thereof), which occupy the literature on Dutch Books. 
Juxtaposing these points develops our picture of the relationship between quantificational 
credences and ordinary and conditional ones. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. First, I’ll provide a primer on quantificational credences. 
Then, I’ll sketch some background on Dutch Books. Next, I’ll introduce the notion of 
quantificational bets. Finally, I will prove the Dutch Book Theorem for the norm on 
quantificational credences. 
 
2. Quantificational Credences 
 In this section I will briefly introduce quantificational credences. Then, I will present a 
purported rational norm involving quantificational credences. 
 
2.1. What are Quantificational Credences? 
 Snoopy thinks that each human is somewhat likely to adopt him. The attitude attributed 
to Snoopy is not an ordinary credence. In particular, it is not a credence of moderate strength in 
the proposition that each human adopts Snoopy. Having this ordinary credence is thinking it 
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somewhat likely that everyone adopts him. But surely the rational Snoopy knows that he will only 
be adopted by one human or family. He thinks it not at all likely that everyone adopts him. So, 
Snoopy does not have a positive strength credence that everyone adopts him, though he does 
think that each human is somewhat likely to adopt him. Therefore, our target thought cannot 
simply be this ordinary credence. 
 It’s also not true that Snoopy thinks that each human is somewhat likely to adopt him 
simply in virtue of some number of ordinary credences that Snoopy has. In particular, we can’t 
say that Snoopy thinks this just in case, for each object that turns out to be a human, x, Snoopy 
has a moderate strength credence that x adopts him. This is because Snoopy likely has no way of 
having de re thoughts about each individual human. This same consideration tells against 
another initially plausible suggestion—that we can say that Snoopy thinks this just in case, for 
each object, x, Snoopy has a moderate strength conditional credence that x adopts him if x is a 
human. Snoopy is even less likely to possess the ability to have de re thoughts about each object. 
The lesson is that for Snoopy to think that each human is somewhat likely to adopt him is neither 
for him to have some ordinary or conditional credence nor for some fact about his ordinary or 
conditional credences to be true. The facts about Snoopy’s ordinary and conditional credences 
don’t determine whether or not Snoopy thinks that each human is somewhat likely to adopt him. 
 Given this, what is it for Snoopy to think that each human is somewhat likely to adopt 
him? It is for him to have what we can call a quantificational credence. A quantificational 
credence is like a commitment to form some ordinary credence or credences on coming to gain 
information. For instance, it is the sort of state that commits Snoopy, upon learning that 
Schroeder is a human, to forming an ordinary credence of moderate strength that Schroeder is 
going to adopt him. This applies similarly to other objects that he learns are humans. I’ll further 
discuss this characteristic role of quantificational credences in the next subsection, where I 
address the norms that they place people under. First, I want to say a bit about what typically 
causes people to form quantificational credences.2 
 Lennertz (in press) says that the characteristic feature of the functional role of 
quantificational credences is that they “give us the ability to properly respond to nonspecific 
probabilistic evidence.” Whereas evidence about a particular human, like Charlie, adopting him 
would lead Snoopy to form an ordinary credence—like a credence of some strength that Charlie 
will adopt him—evidence merely about objects of a certain type will lead Snoopy to have a 
quantificational credence—like his thought that each human is somewhat likely to adopt him. 
Here are some examples of the sort of non-specific evidence that could lead to forming such a 
credence. Snoopy might have statistical evidence that suggests that, for each human, there is 
some chance that that human adopts him. Or he might have general evidence about humans 
finding him cute and wanting to take him home. Or he may have been informed by the reliable 
Woodstock that each human is somewhat likely to adopt him. In each of these cases, his evidence 
is non-specific in that it isn’t de re evidence about any particular human adopting him. Because of 
this, Snoopy comes to have a quantificational credence that isn’t about any particular object, 
though it commits him to possible future positions about many objects—including ones he might 
not at present even know exist. 
 Before moving on to a discussion of norms, I want to briefly explain the structure of these 
attitudes. Using the term “quantificational credence” suggests that the attitude under discussion 
is a partial strength belief with an ordinary content, rather than a full belief with a content that 
talks about partiality. When thinking about ordinary credences, the distinction can be 
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exemplified as follows: thinking it 50% likely that the coin lands heads could be a partial belief of 
50% strength in the proposition that the coin lands heads or it could be a full belief in the 
proposition that the probability that the coin lands heads is 50%. I’m not going to argue 
decisively for the first view here, but I will suggest that a reason that supports thinking that there 
are genuinely partial ordinary and conditional credal attitudes supports thinking that there are 
genuinely partial quantificational credal attitudes. That reason goes as follows: it seems that 
someone without the concept of probability could have these sorts of likely-thoughts. For 
instance, a very young child—one who lacked the concept of probability—could think it pretty 
likely that this green mush is going to be yucky or could think it very likely that this green mush is 
going to be yucky given that it is cold; that is, she could have an ordinary or conditional credence 
without having the ability to have beliefs about probability. Some find this reason to speak 
strongly in favor of thinking that likely-thoughts are (at least in many cases) genuinely partial 
beliefs, or credences. The important point for us is that this reason is just as strong when we 
consider quantificational likely-thoughts. For instance, the same child could think every lump of 
green mush is pretty likely to be yucky; that is, she could have a quantificational credence 
without having the ability to have a belief about probability. I don’t take this reasoning to 
decisively show that it is impossible to make sense of quantificational likely-thoughts as beliefs 
about quantificational probabilistic propositions. But it does show that if we think that ordinary 
and conditional credences should be understood as genuinely partial beliefs, there is very good 
reason to think that quantificational credences should be as well.3 
 In this subsection, I’ve introduced a way of thinking about what quantificational 
credences are. We can further improve our understanding of these attitudes by seeing the sort of 
rational role that they play. So, the ensuing discussion of norms is meant to both introduce the 
subject for my later arguments and help us better understand quantificational credences and the 
role they play in the mental life of the uncertain agent. 
 
2.2. A Norm on Quantificational Credences 
 Suppose, again, that Snoopy has the following quantificational credence: he thinks that 
each human is somewhat likely to adopt him. Suppose that he also thinks that some human is not 
at all likely to adopt him. It seems that such a combination is irrational. The following is a slightly 
different irrational combination. Snoopy has the original quantificational credence, he knows 
that Sally is a human, and he has a credence of strength 0 that Sally will adopt him. Again, it 
seems like such a combination is irrational. 
 We can provide a norm to explain these instances of irrationality. In order to understand 
it, we need to introduce a more technical way of talking about quantificational credences. We 
can call Snoopy’s thought that each human is somewhat likely to adopt him a quantificational 
credence of some strength, for each human, that that human adopts him. In general, for some quantifier, q, 
properties, F and G, and real number, n, we can call a thought that q of the Fs are n-likely to be 
Gs a quantificational credence of strength n, for q of the Fs, that they are Gs. 
 We will build up to the norm by introducing a few new notions.4 First, we need the notion 
of a totally decided set of beliefs—a set of beliefs that includes, for every proposition, a belief in either 
that proposition or its negation—and a totally decided set of credences—a set of credences that 
includes, for every proposition, an ordinary credence in that proposition. Next, we need the 
notion of satisfying a quantificational credence. We can say that a pair consisting of a totally 
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decided set of beliefs, B, and a totally decided set of credences, C, satisfies a quantificational 
credence of strength n, for q of the Fs, that it is G if and only if for each of q of the objects 
believed to be F in B, x, C contains a credence of strength n that x is G. For instance, a pair 
consisting of a totally decided set of beliefs and a totally decided set of credences satisfies a 
thought that each human is somewhat likely to adopt Snoopy if and only if for each object 
believed to be a human, there is a credence of some strength that that object adopts Snoopy. 
Finally, we need the notion of a complete extension of a set of beliefs and a set of credences. The 
general idea here is to extend an actual set of beliefs or credences to be totally decided in a way 
that does not introduce any irrationality. More precisely, a complete extension of a set of beliefs is a 
superset of those beliefs that is totally decided and that includes no further beliefs about those 
propositions in the original set or their negations. A complete extension of a set of credences is a superset 
of those credences that is totally decided and that includes no further credences about those 
propositions or their negations. 
 We can now state the norm. Informally, the idea is that rationality requires a possible way 
of coming to have new beliefs and credences that allow one to satisfy one’s quantificational 
credences. So, one is irrational if one can’t extend one’s beliefs and credences in ways that allow 
one to satisfy one’s quantificational credences. More precisely: 
 Quantificational Consistency: An agent, A, should be such that there is a pair 
 consisting of a complete extension of A’s beliefs and a complete extension of A’s 
 credences that satisfies A’s quantificational credences.5,6 
 We can better understand this norm by seeing how it applies to the two examples 
sketched above. In the first, Snoopy thinks that each human is somewhat likely to adopt him and 
thinks that some human is not at all likely to adopt him. Snoopy is irrational in virtue of these 
two quantificational credences. Quantificational Consistency predicts this. We’ve made no 
special assumptions about Snoopy’s beliefs or ordinary credences; the quantificational credences 
are inconsistent even without any such assumptions. This is because there is no pair consisting of 
a totally decided set of beliefs, B, and totally decided set of credences, C, that satisfies both of 
these quantificational credences. In order to satisfy the first, it must be that, for all objects, x, such 
                                                            
5 The norm that I presented in Lennertz (2015) is more complex because I incorporated conditional credences. 
This is to account for the fact that quantificational credences can clash with conditional ones. I have left them 
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complex norm. 
6 Quantificational Consistency mentions both qualitative beliefs and credences. The way the notion of satisfaction 
functions in the norm requires that beliefs and credences exist and are independent of each other (in the sense 
that there is a possible pair of beliefs and credences that contains a belief in p and a very low credence in p). 
Many theorists want to reduce beliefs to credences which have some sort of property—perhaps credences whose 
strengths fall above some threshold. Could such theorists go in for something like Quantificational Consistency? 
Yes, and though the details are complicated, I’ll give a quick sketch. The new norm would have to be more 
complex than Quantificational Consistency, since we would no longer be able to independently adjust beliefs 
and credences when checking for possible extensions that satisfy a quantificational credence. Thus, we might 
miss out on belief-credence pairs that could satisfy a quantificational credence. We can skirt the problem by 
complicating our procedure. We would need a notion of satisfaction that didn’t require complete extensions of 
beliefs and credences. Instead of looking at a single complete extension of all of an agent’s beliefs and credences, 
we would look at multiple smaller sets of beliefs and credences to avoid any places where the proposed belief-
credence connection would constrain our search in the way suggested above. In general, we would have to be 
more selective about what attitudes we hold fixed in each extension, and then we would have to perform 
multiple extensions, piecing the results together in the appropriate manner. A formal presentation of this sort of 
picture would take us too far afield from our present course. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this 
issue. 
  
that the proposition that x is a human is in B, C contains a moderate strength credence that x 
adopts Snoopy. In order to satisfy the second, it must be that, for some object, y, such that the 
proposition that y is human is in B, C contains a credence of 0 strength that y adopts Snoopy. 
There are no sets B and C that can meet both of these demands. Thus, Snoopy’s quantificational 
credences violate Quantificational Consistency; he is irrational. 
 The other case works in a somewhat different way. This was the case where Snoopy 
thinks that each human is somewhat likely to adopt him, knows that Sally is a human, and has a 
credence of 0 strength that Sally will adopt him. So, any complete extension, B, of Snoopy’s set of 
beliefs will contain the belief that Sally is human and any complete extension, C, of Snoopy’s set 
of credences will contain a credence of 0 that Sally will adopt him. So, it is then impossible for 
<B, C> to satisfy his quantificational credence. That is, it cannot be that, for all objects, x, such 
that the proposition that x is a human is in B, C contains a moderate strength credence that x 
adopts Snoopy. The combination of his belief and credence about Sally make this impossible. So, 
he violates Quantificational Consistency and is irrational. 
 Now that we have seen some examples involving Quantificational Consistency, we are in 
position to offer considerations in its favor. In order to do so, I will first outline a kind of result 
that is used to support norms on credal states. 
 
3. Dutch Book Theorems 
 Dutch Book Theorems are used to support norms of rationality involving credal attitudes. 
They are results that show that any agent who has a credal state (or succession of credal states) 
that violates a given norm is committed to making bets that are guaranteed to lose her money. 
Many philosophers make the further step of claiming that the existence of a Dutch Book 
Theorem for a given norm supports the norm as a principle of rationality.7 In this section, I’ll 
introduce Dutch Books and their relationship to rational norms. 
 
3.1. Credences and Fair Betting Prices 
 Before giving an example to clarify the idea of Dutch Books, I will discuss the connection 
between one’s credences and fair betting prices. The assumed connection is that one’s credences 
sanction as fair particular bets.8 A credence of strength n in p sanctions as fair a bet where one pays 
$n and wins $1 when p is true and $0 when p is false. This credence also sanctions as fair what 
we might call selling the same bet: taking $n to pay out $1 when p is true and $0 when p is false. 
For instance, a credence of .6 that it is sunny in Shanghai sanctions as fair a bet of $.6 to win $1 if 
it is sunny in Shanghai and $0 if it is not sunny in Shanghai. That credence also sanctions as fair 
selling the same bet. Furthermore, that credence sanctions as fair scaled versions of these bets. 
For instance, we could scale the above bets by 10 to get a bet of $6 to win $10 if it is sunny in 
Shanghai and $0 if it is not. 
 If we think about the sorts of bets a rational agent might actually accept, the above 
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endorses this sort of argument. 
8 I follow Christensen (1996) in using the notion of a credence sanctioning a bet as fair. I agree with him that there 
is a natural sense in which this is so (even if a particular agent may not avow the fairness of particular bets). 
Hedden (2013) assimilates the licensing of bets by an agent’s credences to the licensing of action in general by 
those credences in a decision theoretic framework. Though such an account has the theoretical virtue of offering 
a unified picture of bets and other action, it, as Hedden shows, allows that there are agents with incoherent 
credences who are not susceptible to Dutch Books. 
  
discussion idealizes in at least three ways. First, it assumes money to have linear value for an 
agent. But it may be rational to value gains and losses of different amounts of money differently 
(Hájek 2008b). Second, it assumes that bets with an expected utility of 0 are sanctioned as fair. 
But it might be equally rational to for an agent to be indifferent to such bets and refuse them, 
since there is no expected gain (Hellman 1997: 195; Vineberg 2016). Third, it assumes that 
agents are not rationally risk averse. But perhaps it is rational to refuse bets with positive 
expected value where the possible losses are, though unlikely, very great (Buchak 2013; 2014). 
Others have discussed these worries about the setup of Dutch Books, and I will ignore them in 
what follows. As I’ve said, my goal is to argue that, insofar as Dutch Book Arguments are 
successful, we can support Quantificational Consistency using one. 
 
3.2. An Example: Additivity and Dutch Books 
 In this subsection, I’m going to give an example of a Dutch Book for an agent with 
credences that violate a (purported) norm on rationality. That is, I’ll give a series of bets which 
the agent’s credences sanction as fair, but which jointly guarantee the agent a loss no matter how 
the world turns out to be.9 Our example will focus on the following norm on an agent’s credal 
state: 
 Additivity: The strength of an agent’s credence in the disjunction of two inconsistent 
 propositions should be equal to the sum of the strength of her credence in the first and 
 the strength of her credence in the second. 
This norm corresponds to a restricted version of the additivity axiom of probability theory. There 
is a Dutch Book Theorem for this norm: 
 Dutch Book Theorem for Additivity: If an agent’s credal state violates Additivity, then 
 there exists a Dutch Book against her. 
Let’s consider an example where an agent violates this norm and is susceptible to a Dutch Book. 
 Suppose that Charlie has received a single valentine and does not know who it is from. 
Suppose that he has a credence of strength .3 that the valentine came from Patty and a credence 
of strength .2 that the valentine came from Marcie. Further suppose that Charlie has a credence 
of strength .4 that the valentine came from Patti or that the valentine came from Marcie. This 
combination of credences violates Additivity, since the strength of his credence in the disjunction 
(of two inconsistent propositions) is less than the sum of the strengths of his credences in the 
disjuncts. 
 We can arrange a series of bets, each of which is sanctioned as fair by one of his 
credences, that guarantees a sure loss to Charlie. First, we have him bet $3 that the valentine is 
from Patty. If it is from her, he wins $10 and if it is not from her, then he wins $0. Charlie’s 
credence of strength .3 that the valentine came from Patty sanctions this bet as fair. Similar 
considerations hold for the other bets. For the second bet, we have him bet $2 that the valentine 
is from Marcie. Again, if it is from her, he wins $10 and if it is not from her, then he wins $0. 
Finally, we pay $4 to Charlie in a bet that will pay us $10 if the valentine is from Patty or the 
valentine is from Marcie and $0 if the valentine is from neither. This series of bets guarantees 
Charlie a loss. If the valentine is from Patty, Charlie gains $7 from the first bet but loses $2 from 
the second and $6 from the third. This amounts to a loss of $1. If the valentine is from Marcie, 
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Charlie gains $8 from the second bet but loses $3 from the first and $6 from the third—again, a 
loss of $1. Finally, if the valentine is from neither, Charlie makes $4 from the third bet but loses 
$3 from the first and $2 from the second. So, however the world turns out, Charlie is guaranteed 
a loss of $1. That is, he is susceptible to a Dutch Book. 
 This sequence of bets against Charlie constitutes a Dutch Book. But the fact that Charlie 
is susceptible to a Dutch Book is not dependent on any of the particular features of our case. In 
fact, it can be shown that anyone who violates Additivity is susceptible to a Dutch Book—i.e., 
that the Dutch Book Theorem for Additivity is true. Similar results have been shown for a 
number of other purported norms on credal states.10 I won’t rehearse the proof of the Dutch 
Book Theorem for Additivity or these other proofs here, though I will prove a general result for 
Quantificational Consistency. 
 
3.3. What do Dutch Book Theorems show? 
 Alan Hájek (2005) is explicit about the distinction between Dutch Book Theorems and 
Dutch Book Arguments. A Dutch Book Theorem is a result that says that if an agent has a credal 
state with some particular property, there exists a Dutch Book for that agent. The Dutch Book 
Theorem for Additivity, mentioned above, is an example. A Dutch Book Argument takes this 
result and claims that it shows that it is irrational to have a credal state with that property. 
 Many who have accepted the existence of Dutch Book Theorems have doubted the force 
of Dutch Book Arguments. Suppose we accept that if an agent has a credal state that has some 
property, then there is a series of bets that her credences sanction as fair that guarantee her a loss 
(as a Dutch Book Theorem would say). Still, it does not follow that an actual agent with that 
credal state would be subject to sure losses. This would require there actually being nefarious 
bookies around (Christensen 1991: 237; 1996: 451; Vineberg 1997: 186). In addition, it would 
require the agent to not pretend that she has other credences in betting in order to avoid a loss or 
gain other benefits (Christensen 1991: 237; Vineberg 1997: 186; Hájek 2008a calls this masking 
her dispositions; Hájek 2008b). It would also require that an agent does not get wise to such a 
bookie and change her credences in the middle of the series of bets being offered (thus resolving 
the previous inconsistency).11 
 However, the most important worry about the rational import of Dutch Book Theorems 
is that there seems to be a gap between facts about a loss in a series of bets and epistemic 
irrationality. As David Christensen says, “even if probabilistically incoherent agents were subject 
to real practical difficulties, it would not obviously follow that their beliefs were defective from the 
epistemic standpoint” (1996: 451). Furthermore, some doubt that it could show much about 
rationality at all, since just as there are fair bets that the agent will accept that will guarantee her 
a loss, there are fair bets that the agent will accept that will guarantee her a gain.12 
 A classic response to the main worry is to claim that the guarantee of a practical loss does 
not constitute the epistemic irrationality of the agent. Rather the guarantee of a practical loss 
indicates or dramatizes some epistemic inconsistency in the agent’s credal state (Christensen 
1991; 1996). As Christensen says: 
                                                            
10 These include norms corresponding to all of the probability axioms (Skyrms 1986: 185–188), a diachronic 
conditionalization norm (Lewis 1999; Teller 1973: 222–225; Skyrms 1986: 189–192), and the principle of 
reflection (van Fraassen 1984). 
11 See Jackson and Pargetter (1976) and Hellman (1997) for attempts to strip away all of the practical elements of 
Dutch Books, leaving only the epistemic lessons. 
12 See Hájek (2005; 2008a) for discussion of this (what he calls Good or Czech Books) and his solution. 
  
It is also intuitively plausible that, if a set of betting odds allows someone to devise a priori 
a way of exploiting those odds to inflict a sure loss, then there is something amiss with 
those betting odds. And finally, if a single set of beliefs sanctions as fair each of a set of 
betting odds, and that set of odds is defective, then there is something amiss with the 
beliefs themselves. The fact that the diagnosis can be made a priori indicates that the 
defect is not one of fitting the beliefs with the way the world happens to be. Like 
deductive inconsistency, it is a defect internal to the agent’s belief system.13 (1996: 457) 
I’m inclined to think that Dutch Book Theorems do tell us about rational norms, but I won’t try 
to defend this position in this paper. Instead, I will settle for a conditional conclusion: If Dutch 
Book Theorems do support rational norms, then there is support for our rational norm on 
quantificational credences.14 This is because, as I will show, there is a Dutch Book Theorem for 
Quantificational Consistency. 
 
4. Quantificational Bets 
 In order to be able to form our Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Consistency 
we will need to use a heretofore undiscussed sort of bet—a quantificational bet. This is the sort of 
bet that is sanctioned as fair by a quantificational credence. 
 Suppose that Lucy has a quantificational credence of strength .05, for each record in 
Schroeder’s collection, that it is scratched. This attitude sanctions as fair the following 
quantificational bet (or, at least, something very much like it—the details of this qualification will 
be discussed in two paragraphs). Given a finite domain of objects, we have Lucy pay $5 for each 
object in the domain. Then, when Lucy comes to have beliefs about which objects are all and 
only the records in Schroeder’s collection, we proceed as follows. If a given object is not believed 
to be a record in Schroeder’s collection, then the $5 for that object is reimbursed. If a given 
object is believed to be a record in Schroeder’s collection, then Lucy gets the following payout: 
$100 if that record is scratched and $0 if that record is not scratched. If we are worried about 
such practicalities as Lucy not having enough money upfront, then we can run the same sort of 
process but, instead of her paying $5 for each object, we mark down in a ledger that she owes $5 
for each object. We then cross out that debt for each object that she turns out not to believe to be 
one of the records in Schroeder’s collection. For each of the objects that she does come to believe 
are the records in Schroeder’s collection, she must make good on her $5 payment. From there, 
the payout structure is the same as the original presentation of the bet. 
 Lucy’s quantificational credence will sanction this bet as fair. This is for the following 
                                                            
13 Christensen (1991: 239) makes similar remarks. However, readers should see Maher (1997) for a criticism of 
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(1986) makes this assumption of a Dutch Book explicit. And Hellman (1997: 196–7) provides a response for 
projects in the philosophy of science. 
14 The literature is often more nuanced than represented here—where Dutch Books Arguments either succeed in 
supporting norms or they do not. In particular, many authors make a distinction between Dutch Books that 
include bets at a single time—synchronic Dutch Books—and Dutch Books that include bets at multiple times—
diachronic Dutch Books (sometimes called Dutch Strategies). The evidential import of diachronic Dutch Books 
is often taken to be more suspect than the import of synchronic ones—one reason being that there are 
diachronic Dutch Book Theorems for norms that seem obviously false, like the principle of reflection (van 
Fraassen 1984). See Christensen (1991; 1996), Maher (1992), Hellman (1997), and Mahtani (2012). See 
Armendt (1992), Vineberg (1997), Briggs (2009), and Mahtani (2015) for positions which claim that the 
fundamental problem with the Dutch Book Theorem for the principle of reflection is not its diachronicity. In 
Section 5.2 I’ll discuss why my Dutch Book Theorem is not subject to these worries. 
  
reasons: her credence says nothing about objects that are not believed to be one of the records in 
Schroeder’s collection, and the quantificational bet does not, once Lucy’s mind is made up, 
concern them. About each object that she does believe is a record in Schroeder’s collection, Lucy 
is committed by her quantificational credence to thinking that it is 5% likely to be scratched. So, 
her attitude sanctions as fair a sub-wager on that object, which is just equivalent to a $5 bet on 
that object being scratched (to win $100). So, the quantificational bet is just the commitment to 
make, once Lucy is decided about which objects are the records in Schroeder’s collection, the 
combination of such bets on these objects. 
 However, the bet just described isn’t exactly the one that Lucy’s quantificational credence 
sanctions as fair. Really, the bet sanctioned as fair is like the one just described but with an 
important restriction. The bet goes in the way described in a very specific scenario—one where 
Lucy comes to learn which objects are the records in Schroeder’s collection and learns nothing 
else. In scenarios where Lucy learns other facts, the bet is simply called off and all money is 
refunded. Why make this restriction? Because cases where Lucy learns other facts are cases 
where she may be justified in revising her quantificational credence. In originally forming that 
attitude, Lucy isn’t committing to sticking with it come what may. She may get new evidence that 
some of the records in Schroeder’s collection definitely aren’t scratched. So, she may revise her 
quantificational credence to be one of strength .05, for most (rather than all) records in 
Schroeder’s collection, that they are scratched. Since Lucy’s credal state can rationally evolve in 
this way, the bet that her quantificational credence sanctions as fair is one that only continues to 
have grip if what she learns is not evidence against her quantificational credence. The easiest way 
to formalize this is to say that it remains in force in cases where all that she learns is what records 
are all and only those in Schroeder’s collection. Though this restriction will be in place 
throughout the discussion of quantificational bets, I will often omit explicit mention of it except 
where it is particularly relevant. 
 Making this quantificational bet is equivalent to making, for each object in the domain, a 
conditional bet of $5 (to win $100) that it is scratched if it is a record in Schroeder’s collection. 
For a given object, o, the conditional bet of $5 (to win $100) that it is scratched if it is a record in 
Schroeder’s collection is one which has the following payout structure: Lucy’s net payout is $0 if 
she learns that o is not a record in Schroeder’s collection (above I described this as the $5 being 
reimbursed) or if she learns facts beyond those about whether objects are records in Schroeder’s 
collection.15 Lucy’s net payout is $-5 if she learns only that o is a record in Schroeder’s collection 
but it is not scratched (she puts up $5 and wins $0). Lucy’s net payout is $95 if she learns only 
that o is a record in Schroeder’s collection and it is, in fact, scratched (she puts up $5 and wins 
$100). When we consider the collection of bets with this payout structure for each object in the 
domain, we have something equivalent to the quantificational bet explained above. In general, 
making the sort of quantificational bet that is sanctioned as fair by a universal quantificational 
credence is equivalent to making a set of conditional bets. 
 However, not all quantificational bets are equivalent to sets of conditional bets. In 
particular, the bet sanctioned as fair by what we can call a less-than-universal quantificational 
                                                            
15 The reasons for making the restriction I discussed in the previous paragraph apply in much the same way to 
conditional credences. A conditional credence of strength n in p if q sanctions as fair a bet that commits an agent 
to betting on p at odds determined by n if she learns q. But her commitment does not require her to go through 
with this wager if she learns many other things as well, some of which may give her reason to revise her original 
conditional credence. This is why diachronic conditionalization norms are often phrased in terms of what 
credence an agent should have in p at t2 if she has a conditional credence of n in p if q at t1 and comes, at t2, to 
learn only q. 
  
credence is not equivalent to some particular set of conditional bets. Consider the following 
example: Charlie Brown’s baseball team is notoriously bad. Linus knows that it is Charlie’s 
pitching that makes them so bad and that the team sometimes does well when Charlie isn’t there. 
Linus thinks that Charlie will miss exactly three games during the season. So, he thinks that (at 
least and at most) three games are 50% likely to be won by Charlie Brown’s team. This 
quantificational credence—about three games—has less-than-universal quantificational strength. 
 This less-than-universal quantificational credence sanctions as fair the following wager. 
For each object in the domain, we put Linus down for a $50 commitment in the ledger. Let’s 
suppose that Linus comes to have new beliefs about which objects are all and only those that are 
baseball games and does not form new beliefs about anything else. If this were a bet sanctioned as 
fair by a universal quantificational credence, then for every object that Linus comes to believe is 
one of the baseball games, he would owe $50. But it is a less-than-universal quantificational 
credence. So, Linus merely owes $50 for three of the objects that he comes to believe are baseball 
games. And, since he wasn’t committed to which particular games are 50% likely to be wins, he 
can choose which games to wager the $50 on, as long as he does it for exactly three of them 
(presumably he’ll chose the games that Charlie can’t attend—though nothing about the attitude 
itself requires this). For each of the three games for which he chooses to pay $50, he wins $100 if 
Charlie Brown’s team wins that game and he wins $0 if Charlie Brown’s team loses that game. 
This is how a less-than-universal quantificational bet works. 
 This less-than-universal quantificational bet is not equivalent to any particular set of 
conditional bets. It is clearly not equivalent to a set of conditional bets about all objects, since 
Linus is not committed to having money riding on the outcome of each baseball game. 
Additionally, there is no particular bunch of conditional bets about some subset of objects that 
does the job. An easy way to see this is that Linus has a choice, once he learns which objects are 
baseball games, about which three of them he wants to use to make good on his $50 
commitments. There could be no such choice about purely conditional bets. In general, a less-
than-universal quantificational bet is not equivalent to some particular set of conditional bets. It 
is a distinct sort of bet. 
 Given that they are not, in general, reducible to a set of conditional bets, we might 
wonder whether there is something illicit or ill-formed about quantificational bets. Rest assured 
that there is not. They have a well-defined payment and payout structure. One way in which 
they differ from many bets is that there is a choice point after the initial bet is made at which 
certain parts of the bet can be turned off and turned on. But this doesn’t seem different in kind 
from what happens in some casino games. For instance, in craps one can turn off and on many 
parts of one’s bet and one can take some parts back entirely (and put the money back in one’s 
pocket). Just like in the description of a quantificational bet, which parts of the bet are open to be 
made, canceled, and turned on or off in the middle of the game depend on the original bet made. 
Another way in which quantificational bets might seem different from the sorts of bets that we 
commonly think of is that they don’t, when made, involve betting on particular objects having a 
property. But, it’s easy to imagine a casino game that works like this. Imagine a game where five 
cards are drawn and laid face down. In this game one can make a commitment to pay $5 for 
each black card that comes up (and $0 for each red card) with the following payout structure: win 
$100 if that black card is an ace and win $0 if that black card is not an ace. But this is just 
equivalent to what I have been calling a universal quantificational bet. One could also play a 
game with a similar betting structure where the dealer looks at the cards, offers you the black 
cards face down, and you are committed to paying $5 for all but one of them. That is, you must 
discard one of them, but you get to choose which. We can assume that the payout structure from 
  
this point on is the same as for the above game. Such a bet has the structure of a less-than-
universal (all-but-one) quantificational bet. These games—while too clumsy to appear on the floor 
of the Bellagio—are surely betting games. And the sorts of bets that are made in playing them are 
quantificational bets. So, quantificational bets are genuine, well-formed bets. 
 Furthermore, this discussion of quantificational bets applies in the world outside of our 
artificial casino floor. Just as some sorts of choices made under uncertainty dramatize real life 
versions of ordinary bets, other sorts of choices do the same with quantificational bets. In the 
ordinary case, making a choice to go to the party is, in a sense, a bet that performing that action 
will lead to better results than staying home. And one often makes this choice on the basis of 
expected outcome calculations that also appear in explicit betting situations. For instance, 
Franklin may think that the fun of hanging out with his friends weighted by the likelihood that 
they attend the party outweighs the boredom of going to a party where he doesn’t know people 
weighted by the likelihood that his friends skip the party—and it does so to a degree that is larger 
than the assured moderate pleasure of staying home and watching Netflix. But not only do some 
choices to act have the structure of ordinary bets, some choices to act have the structure of 
quantificational bets. Consider Pig Pen on his first day of school making the choice to try to be 
friends with each classmate who chats with him. This is a sort of commitment to attempt to foster 
friendships with (possibly many) people he does not yet know; so, it is not an ordinary choice to 
perform some particular action—not the sort of choice that is a real life application of an ordinary 
bet. Instead, the choice has the structure of a quantificational bet. We can see this by 
understanding why Pig Pen may make this choice. He may think that anyone who chats with 
him is quite likely to be a nice person. And he may highly value being friends with anyone who is 
nice. Based on that quantificational credence and those utilities, it may be that attempting to be 
friends with anyone who chats with him has a better expected outcome than all alternative 
policies. Pig Pen’s reasoning here is structurally similar to that of the agents making the 
quantificational bets that we investigated above. Thus, like their ordinary, non-quantificational 
counterparts, such bets need not be seen merely as confined to artificial games of chance. They 
have the same structure as real-life choices made to perform real-life actions. 
 Now that we have a better grasp on what quantificational bets are, we are in a position to 
prove the Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Consistency. 
 
5. The Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Consistency 
 We can now prove a Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Consistency. Remember 
that Quantificational Consistency says the following: 
Quantificational Consistency: An agent, A, should be such that there is a pair consisting 
of a complete extension of A’s beliefs and a complete extension of A’s credences that 
satisfies A’s quantificational credences. 
The theorem, then, looks as follows: 
 Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Consistency: If an agent’s credal state violates  
Quantificational Consistency, then there exists a Dutch Book against her. 
I’ll start the section with some examples where someone violates Quantificational Consistency 
and is susceptible to a Dutch Book. Then, I’ll present a note about the nature and structure of 
our Dutch Book. Finally, I’ll prove the Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Consistency. 
 
5.1. Examples of Dutch Books for Agents Who Violate Quantificational Consistency 
 Charlie wants to kick the football to the moon, but he realizes that Lucy almost always 
pulls the ball away the moment before he tries to kick it. So, he has a quantificational credence, a 
  
thought that each attempt is unlikely—for precision let’s assume 5% likely—to be one where he 
kicks the football to the moon. But suppose he is, at some particular time, overcome by optimism 
that this attempt, call it Attempt X, will be one where he kicks the football to the moon. So, he 
also has an ordinary credence, a thought that it is very likely—for precision, let’s assume 99% 
likely—that Attempt X is one where he kicks the football to the moon. Furthermore, Charlie 
believes that Attempt X is an attempt. Charlie is obviously irrational. He violates 
Quantificational Consistency. 
 We can form a Dutch Book, showing that Charlie’s credences and quantificational 
credences sanction as fair a series of bets that guarantee Charlie a loss. First we make a bet that is 
sanctioned as fair by his ordinary credence. We have Charlie pay us $99 to win $100 if Attempt 
X is one where he kicks the football to the moon and to win $0 if Attempt X is not one where he 
kicks the football to the moon. 
 Next we use a quantificational bet in our Dutch Book. We buy from Charlie a $5 
quantificational bet that, for each attempt, it is one where he kicks the football to the moon. That 
is, we mark down in the ledger that we owe Charlie $5 for each object in the domain that he 
knows is an attempt. He pays us $100 for each attempt in which he kicks the football to the 
moon, and he pays us $0 for each attempt in which he does not kick the football to the moon. As 
discussed in Section 4, a quantificational credence like Charlie’s will sanction this bet as fair. 
 We can’t simply combine this quantificational bet with the bet sanctioned by his ordinary 
credence. The result would not form a Dutch book. It is true that one of the ledger entries for the 
quantificational bet is equivalent to a conditional bet of $5 that Attempt X is one where he kicks 
the football to the moon, given that Attempt X is an attempt. That conditional sub-wager (of the 
quantificational bet), together with the ordinary bet just mentioned, does (given Charlie’s 
learning only that Attempt X is an attempt) guarantee a loss with respect to these bets on 
Attempt X, no matter how the world turns out. We can see this as follows: If Attempt X is one 
where Charlie kicks the football to the moon, then he wins $1 from the ordinary bet and loses 
$95 from the conditional sub-bet, for a total $94 loss. If Attempt X is not one where Charlie kicks 
the football to the moon, then he loses $99 from the ordinary bet and wins $5 from the 
conditional sub-bet, for a total $94 loss. 
 But, the quantificational bet comprises conditional sub-bets on every object in the 
domain. If there are other objects in the domain that Charlie learns to be attempts, then these 
bets won’t simply be called off; they will pay off one way or another. And Charlie might win back 
all of his money and more through them. So, Charlie would not be guaranteed a loss—as is 
necessary for a Dutch Book. Because of this, we can’t simply combine the quantificational bet 
and the ordinary bet to form a Dutch Book. But, if we were able to isolate that one part of the 
quantificational bet and combine it with the ordinary bet, we would be able to Dutch Book 
Charlie in the way we saw in the previous paragraph. 
Indeed, we can isolate it by introducing a quantificational bet that cancels out everything 
except the required conditional sub-bet. We just need to have Charlie make something like the 
reverse quantificational bet. It will be a $5 quantificational bet that, for every attempt except 
Attempt X, it is one where he kicks the football to the moon. And instead of buying the bet from 
Charlie, we sell the bet to him. That is, we mark in the ledger that he owes us $5 for each object 
in the domain that is an attempt other than Attempt X. For each such object, we pay him $100 if 
it is an attempt where he kicks the football to the moon and we pay him $0 if it is an attempt 
where he does not kick the football to the moon. 
Charlie’s quantificational credence sanctions this bet as fair. To see why, we need to 
understand that a universal quantificational credence sanctions as fair not only quantificational 
  
bets but also a great many conditional bets. Suppose that I have a universal quantificational 
credence of strength n, for each F, that it is G. This sanctions as fair a conditional bet of $n on 
Go given Fo. That is, it sanctions as fair either buying or selling a bet of $n that pays $1 if Fo and 
Go are true, pays $0 if Fo is true and Go is false, and is called off (and the $n refunded) if Fo is 
false. Why does it sanction this as fair? Because if I have that quantificational credence and I 
learn that Fo is true, I am committed to thinking that Go is n-likely to be true. But there is 
nothing special about the choice of the object, o. Such reasoning holds for every object. So, my 
quantificational credence sanctions as fair a conditional bet of this sort for every object. This 
reasoning applies to the quantificational bet mentioned in the previous paragraph. Charlie’s 
quantificational credence sanctions as fair buying and selling conditional bets on every object, 
where $5 is paid to win $100 if that object is attempt where he kicks the football to the moon and 
win $0 if it is an attempt where he does not kick the football to the moon (and the $5 is refunded 
if it is not an attempt). Grouping together all of these conditional bets except the one about 
Attempt X yields the desired reverse quantificational bet. So, it is sanctioned as fair by Charlie’s 
quantificational credence.16 
 Importantly, Charlie’s reverse quantificational bet balances out the first quantificational 
bet with respect to every object other than Attempt X. For every attempt other than Attempt X, 
we both give $5 to and take $5 from Charlie (for a net exchange of $0). If that attempt is one 
where he kicks the ball to the moon, we both win $100 from and lose $100 to Charlie (for a net 
exchange of $0). Likewise, if it is one where he does not kick the ball to the moon. What is left is 
equivalent to buying a conditional bet from Charlie for $5 that Attempt X is one where he kicks 
the football to the moon, given that it is an attempt. This, together with Charlie’s ordinary bet of 
$99 that Attempt X is one where he kicks the football to the moon, guarantees him a loss, as we 
saw four paragraphs ago. So, if Dutch Book Arguments show what they purport to, then we have 
shown that Charlie is irrational. 
 There is a sense in which this procedure, involving quantificational bets that cancel out 
parts of other quantificational bets, is unnecessarily complex. We could reach the same result by 
simply using the fact that we just saw—that a universal quantificational credence sanctions as fair 
each conditional sub-bet of the quantificational bet sanctioned as fair by that attitude. The 
canceling of large parts of the quantificational bet allows us to mimic a single conditional bet. 
And this is enough to form the Dutch Book. However, using this fuller method allows us to 
assimilate cases that include only universal quantificational credences to those that include less-
than-universal quantificational credences. As the following example will show, cases involving the 
latter sort of attitude require the more complicated strategy. 
 The example will also be different from the one just given along another dimension—one 
which was discussed in Section 2.2. The case just given was one where a quantificational 
credence is inconsistent with some ordinary credence, given the agent’s beliefs. The one I’m 
about to give involves an inconsistency just in virtue of quantificational credences. Nonetheless, it 
is the existence of the less-than-universal quantificational credence (and not this latter difference) 
that calls for the more complex strategy. 
 Consider again Charlie Brown’s terrible baseball team. Suppose that, because the team is 
so awful, Linus thinks that each baseball game is 1% likely to be won by Charlie Brown’s team. 
But suppose, again, that Linus also knows that the team sometimes does well when Charlie can’t 
                                                            
16 I ignore very general worries about whether each of these conditional bets being sanctioned as fair means that 
all, or all but one, are sanctioned collectively, since these are not unique to the issue being discussed here, but 
apply to all Dutch Books. See Footnote 13 for discussion. 
  
play. And he thinks that Charlie will miss three games. So, he thinks that three games are 50% 
likely to be won by Charlie Brown’s team. In this situation, Linus has a credal state that violates 
Quantificational Consistency. There is no extension of his beliefs and credences that satisfies his 
quantificational credences. We can show that he is irrational by subjecting him to a Dutch Book. 
 Linus’s first quantificational credence sanctions as fair a quantificational bet of $1, for 
each baseball game, that it is won by Charlie Brown’s Team. In the ledger, we mark down our 
commitment to paying Linus $1 for each baseball game (for each object in the domain that we 
come to know is not one of the baseball games, we owe nothing). Linus pays us $100 for each 
baseball game that is won by Charlie Brown’s team, and he pays us $0 for each baseball game 
that is not won by Charlie Brown’s team. 
 We then offer Linus the following quantificational bet, which is sanctioned as fair by his 
second quantificational credence. We provisionally put him down in the ledger for $50 for each 
baseball game. But the provision is that he must cancel the wager for all-but-three of the objects 
he learns are the baseball games. This is because he only has a commitment regarding three such 
games. So, there will remain, once he learns what the baseball games are, three for which he 
owes $50. It is up to Linus which three will remain part of the wager. For each of these, he wins 
$100 if it is a game that is won by Charlie Brown’s team and wins $0 if it isn’t. 
 Given these two quantificational bets and the fact that Linus will learn that some objects 
are baseball games, he is committed, for at least one baseball game (three, actually), to actions 
that are equivalent to betting, at two different odds, on it being a win for Charlie Brown’s team.17 
Consider the following charts, which display Linus’s betting commitments in light of his 
quantificational bet after learning that, say, objects a-f are all and only the baseball games: 
 
Linus’s universal quantificational credence commits him to all of the bets in this chart: 
Object  Payout to Linus 
a  $-99 if Charlie Brown’s team wins a  $1 if Charlie Brown’s team loses a 
b  $-99 if Charlie Brown’s team wins b  $1 if Charlie Brown’s team loses b 
c  $-99 if Charlie Brown’s team wins c  $1 if Charlie Brown’s team loses c 
d  $-99 if Charlie Brown’s team wins d  $1 if Charlie Brown’s team loses d 
e  $-99 if Charlie Brown’s team wins e  $1 if Charlie Brown’s team loses e 
f  $-99 if Charlie Brown’s team wins f  $1 if Charlie Brown’s team loses f 
 
Linus’s less-than-universal quantificational credence commits him to exactly three of the bets in 
this chart: 
Object  Payout to Linus 
a  $50 if Charlie Brown’s team wins a  $-50 if Charlie Brown’s team loses a 
b  $50 if Charlie Brown’s team wins b  $-50 if Charlie Brown’s team loses b 
c  $50 if Charlie Brown’s team wins c  $-50 if Charlie Brown’s team loses c 
d  $50 if Charlie Brown’s team wins d  $-50 if Charlie Brown’s team loses d 
e  $50 if Charlie Brown’s team wins e  $-50 if Charlie Brown’s team loses e 
                                                            
17 In the case where no objects are baseball games (and, so, none are learned to be baseball games), the bets won’t, 
together, guarantee a loss. Rather, Linus will break even. To avoid this potential escape hatch, we could include 
in our Dutch Book a third bet based on Linus’s credence that some object is a baseball game. As long as that 
credence is positive, he will lose in the scenarios that we are worried about—where no objects are baseball 
games. But we make the stakes quite small, so that it can be overwhelmed by loses from the bets in the text in 
cases where he wins this bet. Since this side bet is not an interesting part of the inconsistency, I’ll confine 
discussion of it to this note. 
  
f  $50 if Charlie Brown’s team wins f  $-50 if Charlie Brown’s team loses f 
 
Linus will choose three rows from the second chart to go through with. For each row he chooses, 
he will then be betting on the object of that row at different prices. For instance, suppose Linus 
chooses to go through with the bets from the second chart on b, c, and f. Then he is committed 
to betting on b, c, and f at different odds, as can be seen by comparing the b, c, and f rows on the 
two tables. Call an object that he is committed to betting on at different odds a focal object (in our 
example there are three focal objects). 
 Our strategy, in order to guarantee a loss, is to choose one of the focal objects. For all 
objects other than that focal object, we give Linus the reverse bet. Continuing with our example 
above, but without loss of generality, suppose we choose c as the designated focal object. Then, 
we put Linus in the ledger for $1 for each baseball game other than c. For each such game, we 
pay him $100 if it is won by Charlie Brown’s team and we pay him $0 if it is not. This bet 
neutralizes all of our first quantificational bet with Linus except for the part that constitutes a bet 
on c. We then have him perform a similar neutralizing bet with regard to his second 
quantificational bet. For each of the three objects followed through on in the second 
quantificational bet other than c (that is, b and f), we mark in the ledger that we owe $50 to 
Linus. He then pays us $100 for each game that is won by Charlie Brown’s team and $0 for each 
that is not.18 This bet neutralizes all of Linus’s second quantificational bet except for the part that 
constitutes a bet on c. 
 These quantificational bets neutralize all parts of the original bets except for the parts that 
constitute bets on the designated focal object, c. Linus is committed to thinking that game c is 1% 
likely to be won by Charlie Brown’s team and 50% likely to be won by Charlie Brown’s team. 
So, if it is won by Charlie Brown’s team, Linus loses $99 on the first bet and wins $50 on the 
second for a net loss of $49. If c is not won by Charlie Brown’s team, Linus wins $1 on the first 
bet and loses $50 on the second, for a net loss of $49. So, we’ve devised a system of bets that 
Linus’s quantificational credences sanction as fair that guarantee him a loss. 
 Let’s reflect on why we had to use the more complicated strategy here. Unlike in our 
original example with Charlie and the football, here we didn’t know ahead of time precisely 
where the inconsistency would manifest itself. But we did know that it would manifest itself 
somewhere. So, we had a strategy that, no matter how Linus choose to bet based on his less-than-
universal quantificational credence, guaranteed him a loss. In our particular case we supposed 
that the parts of the second quantificational bet that Linus followed through on were those on b, 
c, and f, and we chose c as the designated focal object for forming our Dutch Book. Of course, 
Linus could have chosen differently, but it should be clear that the same general strategy would 
work no matter which three objects he chose. Thus, he was guaranteed a loss even though we 
couldn’t tell ahead of time where exactly that loss would come about (i.e., what the focal objects 
would be). 
 
5.2. A Preliminary Note about Our Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Consistency 
 Before proving our theorem, we need to discuss the nature of the examples we have just 
                                                            
18 We might be worried that his quantificational credence need not sanction this bet as fair, though it did sanction 
as fair the reverse universal quantificational bet. This is because it is, in a sense, up to him which are the three 
baseball games to bet on. However, in making that choice with his first less-than-universal quantificational bet, 
he has already committed himself. Considering only agents who actually follow through on this commitment is, 
admittedly, an idealization. But this idealization is of a kind with some of those mentioned in Section 3, like the 
idealization that the agent not bet out of line with her credences when she sees a loss coming. 
  
seen and of the theorem we will prove. In Section 3 we explored the standard characterization of 
a Dutch Book as a series of bets that an agent’s credences sanction as fair which guarantee her a 
loss no matter which way the world turns out to be. For our purposes, we need to slightly amend 
this notion. For instance, suppose we are dealing with a quantificational bet sanctioned as fair by 
a quantificational credence of strength n, for q of the Fs, that they are Gs. For our Dutch Book 
Theorem, we are only going to be concerned with a subset of the ways that the world could turn 
out to be—those in which the only thing that an agent learns are what objects are all and only the 
Fs.19 Admittedly, this restricts us to only a proper subset of the ways the world could turn out to 
be. In this subsection, I’ll first explain why this restriction is necessary for our Dutch Book 
Theorem, and I’ll then explain why the restriction doesn’t diminish the support that the Dutch 
Book gives for Quantificational Consistency. 
 First, suppose that we have an agent who, at t1, has the above quantificational credence as 
part of a credal state that violates Quantificational Consistency. There are cases where she is not 
subject to a guaranteed loss because she learns some things at t2 (before learning which objects 
are all and only the Fs) that cause her to revise her quantificational credence, dissolving the 
irrationality. In this case, the quantificational bet sanctioned as fair at t1 would be cancelled with 
no payout, even though our agent was indeed irrational at t1. The problem is that we don’t want 
her uncertainty, at t1, about what objects are the Fs to affect whether we find a way to show that 
she is irrational. By focusing only on ways the world could be where she learns only which objects 
are all and only the Fs after the placement of the bet, we avoid situations like this. 
 But can we make such a restriction and still claim, as I will below, that a Dutch Book 
Theorem of this sort supports Quantificational Consistency?20 First, we should keep in mind that 
Quantificational Consistency is a synchronic norm. So, our target for investigation is not the 
progression of a credal state over time. More importantly, the only reason time plays a role in our 
examples is that it allows uncertainty about which objects are all and only the Fs to be resolved. If 
not for this, the Dutch Book could take place at a single time. Since the only reason we care 
about running time forward is for this purpose, restricting the ways the world could turn out to 
be to just those where what is learned is exactly which objects are all and only the Fs does not 
take away from the evidential impact of these Dutch Books. We are not imposing restrictions on 
things that affect the payout in a suspect way (e.g., by ignoring possible worlds where some 
objects are F or some other objects are G). So, this move does not take away from the degree to 
which our Dutch Book Theorem supports our norm, Quantificational Consistency. 
 We could even think of the temporal factor of our Dutch Book as merely a dramatization 
of the formal or logical issue of the possible ways of extending a credal state from uncertainty 
(about which objects are all and only the Fs) to belief. And the Dutch Book Theorem that I will 
prove in Section 5.3 shows that any of these possibilities being actualized leads to a loss for the 
agent. It is not meant to tell us anything important about how a credal state should or should not 
evolve over time (like a conditionalization norm does) nor about whether a current credal state is 
consistent with a future credal state (like a reflection norm does). Appreciating this allows us to 
see that a worry about the epistemic significance of Diachronic Dutch Book Arguments (like 
those in favor of conditionalization and reflection) does not apply here. For instance, Christensen 
(1991) gives a number of examples which aim to show that Diachronic Dutch Book Arguments, 
by themselves, fail to provide support for norms of epistemic rationality. He thinks that they fail 
                                                            
19 If a reader quibbles with my continuing to use the name “Dutch Book”, she is welcome to think in terms of a 
nearby notion (what we could call a “Dutch Book*”) which, as I’ll argue, has the same evidential force. 
20 Or, more carefully, that it does so on the condition that any Dutch Book Theorems offer such support. 
  
because we don’t have any antecedent reason to think that diachronic inconsistency is irrational 
(though he stresses that we do have reason to think that synchronic inconsistency is). 
 A major reason for doubting that Diachronic Dutch Books provide evidential support for 
norms on rationality is that one can be proven for a proposed principle of rationality that is 
generally thought to be false—the principle of reflection. I’m inclined to agree with those who, 
like Briggs (2009) and Mahtani (2015), maintain that the problem with the Dutch Book 
Argument for the principle of reflection is not fundamentally about either the principle or the 
series of bets being diachronic (see also Vineberg, 1997, for worries about the examples 
Christensen uses to come to the conclusion that we just saw). But even if Christensen is right, his 
worry does not apply to our (to be proved) Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational 
Consistency, given the characterization that I gave in the previous paragraph.21 This is because 
there is reason to think that synchronic consistency is required between one’s quantificational 
credences (and one’s ordinary credences). Quantificational Consistency is not a norm on 
consistency of one’s credal state across time or at different times. It is a norm prescribing 
synchronic consistency.22 We have, then, by Christensen’s own lights, independent reason for 
thinking that the type of inconsistency that our Dutch Book will expose is, indeed, irrational—
precisely what Christensen thinks makes Synchronic Dutch Book Arguments plausible. Thus, 
since our Dutch Book Theorem is not fundamentally diachronic—appearances of diachronicity 
are merely a dramatization of the resolution of uncertainty—the proof of the Theorem has 
exactly as much evidential import as the standard Dutch Books that we saw in Section 3.23 
 
5.3. Proof of the Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Consistency 
 We saw how to guarantee a loss for our protagonists in the examples above. Now we will 
see that in all cases where an agent violates Quantificational Consistency, she will be subject to a 
Dutch Book (i.e., the Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Consistency is true). The proofs 
of many Dutch Book Theorems give a recipe for forming bets that would guarantee a loss to the 
agent who violated the norm. The proof that I will give of the Dutch Book Theorem for 
Quantificational Consistency won’t do that. Instead, I’ll give a simple existence proof, showing 
that a Dutch Book exists in all cases where Quantificational Consistency is violated. Given the 
complexity of our quantificational bets and the different methods of Dutch Books corresponding 
to different ways of violating Quantificational Consistency, a mere existence proof is more 
streamlined. If the reader wants a recipe for forming Dutch Books in particular cases, she can 
glean one from the examples in the previous subsection. 
 Our first preliminary is to model the connection between credences—both ordinary and 
                                                            
21 Our Dutch Book Theorem also retains its force on Briggs’s (2009) way of drawing the line between those Dutch 
Books that signal irrationality and those that don’t. The latter, which include the Dutch Book Theorem for the 
principle of reflection, expose self-doubt, but this is not what is exposed by the one that I will prove in Section 
5.3. I suspect that we would also be able to give a Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Consistency of the 
sort suggested in Mahtani (2015), though the details would require a much lengthier discussion about the 
structure of quantificational credences and what parts of that structure are and are not the sorts of things that 
require an interpretation (in the logical sense which is at play in her characterization of Dutch Books). See 
Footnote 9. 
22 A norm prescribing synchronic consistency is stronger than simply a synchronic norm. As Christensen (1991: 
240) points out, the principle of reflection is a synchronic norm, since it merely prescribes that one has a 
particular credence at a particular time. But it is not a norm prescribing synchronic consistency, since the 
prescription it makes for that credence is that it should relate in the right way to one’s credence at a future time. 
Quantificational Consistency is both a synchronic norm and a norm prescribing synchronic consistency. 
23 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer whose comments prompted the addition of this subsection. 
  
quantificational—and betting prices that are sanctioned as fair. Though the final machinery 
might look complex, I’ll build the picture from simple roots in order to make clear why each 
change is introduced. We know that an ordinary credence sanctions as fair bets at particular 
prices on some proposition. For instance, a credence of strength .3 that it will rain today 
sanctions as fair both buying and selling a bet of $3 to win $10 if it rains today and win $0 if it 
does not rain today. We want to represent all of the bets sanctioned as fair not just by a single 
credence but by a set of credences. The easiest way to do this is to let the set of credences itself, 
C, represent these bets. The betting price sanctioned as fair for each credence is determined in 
the way of the rain example just discussed. A credence of strength n in p sanctions as fair both 
buying and selling a bet of $n to win $1 if p is true and $0 if p is false (as well as scaled versions of 
this bet). 
 However, it will be beneficial (for reasons that will be discussed) for us to represent the 
bets sanctioned as fair by a set of credences, C, in a more complex way. We will represent the 
bets with a set of pairs consisting of a set of beliefs and C: 
 |C| = {<B, C>: B is a set of beliefs}. 
That is, we take C and successively pair it with each possible set of beliefs. Each pair represents 
the bets sanctioned as fair by the set of credences of that pair (in the way discussed above) given 
the set of beliefs it is paired with. Since a set of beliefs does not affect the bets sanctioned as fair 
by a set of credences, the belief portion of the pair plays no substantial role. No information is 
gained or lost in moving from the previous modeling choice to this slightly bulkier one. 
 The reason we model the bets sanctioned as fair by sets of ordinary credences with belief-
credence pairs is that it allows us to have a unified way of representing the bets sanctioned as fair 
by sets of ordinary credences and by quantificational credences. In order to properly represent 
the bets sanctioned as fair by quantificational credences—quantificational bets—we need to 
allow for interaction between a set of beliefs and a set of credences. I’ll explain why this is so for a 
universal quantificational credence of strength n, for each F, that it is G. But the point extends to 
less-than-universal ones as well. Our quantificational credence sanctions as fair a quantificational 
bet. As we saw in Section 4, this bet is not equivalent to any particular ordinary bet or set of 
ordinary bets. So, we cannot simply represent it by a set of credences. The quantificational bet 
can be open-ended, in the sense that the agent need not know which objects are all and only the 
Fs.24 Once we add to the agent’s belief state beliefs about which objects are all and only the Fs, 
she is committed to bets on those individual objects—bets that are equivalent to those sanctioned 
as fair by a set of credences. But it is only the addition of these beliefs that commits her to betting 
in line with those odds. What that means is that we can represent this way that the 
quantificational bet sanctioned as fair by her quantificational credence plays out only as a set of 
ordinary credences, given some set of beliefs. Since there are a number of ways that the bet could 
play out, I group these pairs together and use a set of pairs of sets of beliefs and sets of credences 
to represent the quantificational bet sanctioned as fair by a quantificational credence. 
 While this general explanation helps to justify our modeling choice, it is also helpful to see 
exactly how we model the quantificational bet sanctioned as fair by a quantificational credence. 
Let’s first think about our universal quantificational credence of strength n, for each F, that it is 
G, and then generalize to other cases. As we just saw, modeling the quantificational bet 
sanctioned as fair by this credence involves an interplay between beliefs and credences. So, for 
                                                            
24 Even if the agent does know which objects are all and only the Fs, in the case of a less-than-universal 
quantificational credence, the agent need not yet know which q parts of the quantificational bet she will follow 
through on (i.e., which of these objects to bet on at odds n that they are G). 
  
each set of beliefs an agent could have about which objects are all and only the Fs, there is a set 
of credences that sanctions as fair the ordinary bets that an agent is committed to. Let’s first 
investigate the pair for one way of deciding which objects are all and only the Fs. Let b1 be the 
belief that o1 is F, b2 be the belief that o2 is F, . . . , bj be the belief that oj is F. Let B* = {b1, b2, . . 
. , bj} and suppose that B* is the set of beliefs about which objects are all and only the Fs. There 
is, then, a set of credences, C*, that corresponds to B*. Where c1 is a credence of strength n that 
o1 is G, c2 is a credence of strength n that o2 is G, . . . , and cj is a credence of strength n that oj is 
G, C* = {c1, c2, . . . , cj}. Thus, <B*, C*> is a member of the set of pairs that represents the 
quantificational bet, in the sense that for an agent who takes that bet and comes to have B* as the 
set of beliefs about which objects are all and only the Fs, the quantificational bet requires the 
agent to make bets that are equivalent to those sanctioned as fair by C*. However, one could 
have different beliefs (other than B*) about which objects are all and only the Fs. For any set of 
beliefs about which objects are all and only the Fs, the universal quantificational bet will require 
an agent to take bets that are equivalent to a set of ordinary bets sanctioned as fair by the set of 
credences of strength n about each object believed to be F being G (in the way we just saw with 
B* and C*). We can model the universal quantificational bet by all possible pairs of this sort: 
{<B', C'>: B' is a set of beliefs about which objects are all and only the Fs, and for each object, x, 
believed in B' to be F, there is a credence in C' of strength n that x is G}. 
 Things are only slightly more complex in the case of a less-than-universal quantificational 
credence of strength n, for q of the Fs, that they are Gs. In the universal case, we had, for an 
agent with the set of beliefs about which objects are all and only the Fs, {b1, b2, . . . , bj}, that the 
quantificational bet prescribed bets equivalent to the ordinary bets sanctioned as fair by {c1, c2, . . 
. , cj}. This is not so for the less-than-universal case, since our agent need only follow through on 
bets including q of o1, o2, . . . , oj. What we know, then, is that letting {b1, b2, . . . , bj} be the 
beliefs about which objects are all and only the objects that are F, the quantificational bet will 
prescribe bets equivalent to ordinary bets sanctioned as fair by some combination of q of the 
members of {c1, c2, . . . , cj}. But, since it is up to the agent to choose, we can’t write in stone 
which combination this will be.25 For instance, if q is exactly three, we know that the 
quantificational bet will prescribe bets equivalent to the ordinary bets sanctioned by exactly three 
of the members of {c1, c2, . . . , cj}. So, our set of pairs will include (where j ≥ 7) <{b1, b2, . . . , 
bj}, {c1, c2, c3}>, <{b1, b2, . . . , bj}, {c1, c4, c6}>, and <{b1, b2, . . . , bj}, {c4, c5, c7}>, among 
others. That is, it will include multiple pairs that include the same set of beliefs—in contrast to 
our modeling of universal quantificational credences. More generally, we can model the 
quantificational bet sanctioned as fair by Q (where Q is a quantificational credence with any 
strength of quantification, q) as follows: 
 |Q| = {<B', C'>: B' is a set of beliefs about which objects are all and only the Fs, and for 
 q of the objects, x, believed in B' to be F, there is a credence in C' of strength n that x is 
 G}.26 
                                                            
25 It’s worth noting that our lack of knowledge of an agent’s choice in an actual scenario won’t be a problem for us, 
since the Dutch Book will exist in exactly the cases where no matter which choices the agent makes, she is 
subject to a sure loss. 
26 Strictly speaking, I’ve introduced two |•| functions. The first function takes a set of credences as its argument 
and yields, as its value, a set of pairs—the first member of which is a set of beliefs and the second member of 
which is that set of credences. The second function takes a quantificational credence as its argument and yields 
the set of pairs of sets of beliefs and sets of credences in the way that we just saw in the text. But there is a reason 
that I use the same notation to talk about two different functions. It is that each function is supposed to model 
  
 Now that we have a way of modeling ordinary and quantificational bets, we can take care 
of one final preliminary before proving our Dutch Book Theorem. We’ll be concerned not 
simply with whether the quantificational bets sanctioned as fair by an agent’s quantificational 
credences can, on some way of coming to have beliefs about which objects are all and only the 
Fs, avoid a sure loss, but whether the quantificational bets sanctioned as fair by her 
quantificational credences can, on a way of coming to have beliefs about which objects are all 
and only the Fs that takes into account the beliefs she already has, avoid a sure loss. So, we’re 
only going to want to investigate ways of filling out the quantificational bet that incorporate the 
beliefs that she already has. We can define, for the agent’s (possibly incomplete) set of beliefs 
about objects being F, B^, the following: 
|Q|B^ = {<B', C'>: B' is a set of beliefs about which objects are all and only the Fs, B^ ⊆ 
B', and, for q of the objects, x, believed in B' to be F, there is a credence in C' of strength 
n that x is G}. 
 Now we’re in a position to prove our theorem—that if an agent’s credal state violates 
Quantificational Consistency, then there exists a Dutch Book against her. We’ll do this in three 
steps. Suppose that an agent A has a (possibly empty) set beliefs B^ about whether objects are F, 
quantificational credences, Q1, Q2, . . . , Qk, and a set of ordinary credences, C. The Dutch Book 
Theorem for Quantificational Consistency follows obviously from three Lemmas: 
 Lemma 1: If A’s credal state violates Quantificational Consistency, then |Q1|B^ ∩ |Q2|B^ 
 ∩ . . . ∩ |Qk|B^ ∩ |C| = Æ. 
Lemma 2: If |Q1|B^ ∩ |Q2|B^ ∩ . . . ∩ |Qk|B^ ∩ |C| = Æ, then A is committed to 
betting on some proposition at different odds. 
Lemma 3: If A is committed to betting on some proposition at different odds, then there 
exists a Dutch Book against A. 
I will prove the Lemmas in reverse order. 
 Lemma 3 says that if A is committed to betting on some proposition at different odds, 
then there exists a Dutch Book against A. We can see this as follows (Skyrms 1986: 187): Imagine 
an agent for whom a bet on p is sanctioned both at odds n and at odds m ¹ n. Suppose for now 
that m < n. Then we have the agent bet $n on p to win $1 if p is true and $0 if p is false. And we 
buy from the agent a bet of $m on p to win $1 if p is true and $0 if p is false. Such an agent is 
guaranteed a loss. Whether p is true or false, she wins $(m-n), and since m < n, this constitutes a 
loss. In the case where m > n, we simply switch places with the agent and a loss is guaranteed in 
the same way. This completes the proof of Lemma 3—that if A is committed to betting on some 
proposition at different odds, then there exists a Dutch Book against A. 
 Now let’s suppose that |Q1|B^ ∩ |Q2|B^ ∩ . . . ∩ |Qk|B^ ∩ |C| = Æ toward showing 
that A is then committed to betting on some proposition at different odds (as Lemma 2 states). 
Remember that |Q|B^ is a set of pairs. Each pair represents a set of ordinary bets that she would 
be committed to on some possible way of resolving her uncertainty about which objects are all 
and only the Fs (and making the choices left to her, in the case of a less-than-universal 
quantificational credence). So, the set |Q|B^ as a whole represents, for each of the possible ways 
of resolving her uncertainty about which objects are all and only Fs (and making the choices left 
to her, in the case of a less-than-universal quantificational credence), the set of ordinary bets that 
she would be committed to. Now let’s consider two quantificational credences, Q1 and Q2 (and 
let’s adopt the convention that Qy is a quantificational credence of strength n, for q of the Fys that 
                                                            
the bet (or bets) sanctioned as fair by its argument. So, I’ve introduced this technical sloppiness for the purpose 
of conceptual unity. 
  
they are Gys). |Q1|B^ ∩ |Q2|B^ represents, for each of the possible ways of resolving her 
uncertainty about which objects are all and only the F1s and which are all and only the F2s, the 
set of ordinary bets that would satisfy the betting commitments of both Q1 and Q2. What is 
important for us to consider is the significance of cases where |Q1|B^ ∩ |Q2|B^ = Æ. If this is the 
case, then, for each of the possible ways of resolving her uncertainty about which objects are all 
and only the F1s and which are all and only the F2s, there is no single set of ordinary bets that 
would satisfy the betting commitments of both Q1 and Q2. Given B^, Q1 commits her to bet at 
one of various odds on whatever objects she comes to believe to be all and only the F1s, that they 
are G1s, and Q2 commits her to bet at various odds on whatever objects she comes to believe to 
be all and only the F2s, that they are G2s. But there is no single set of odds that, given B^, allows 
her to satisfy both betting commitments with respect to some proposition. So, given B^, Q1 and 
Q2 commit the agent to betting on that proposition at different odds. The same is true when we 
consider any finite number of quantificational credences. If |Q1|B^ ∩ |Q2|B^ ∩ . . . ∩ |Qk|B^ = 
Æ, then given B^, Q1, Q2, . . . , Qk commit the agent to betting on some proposition at different 
odds. Finally, there are possible cases where |Q1|B^ ∩ |Q2|B^ ∩ . . . ∩ |Qk|B^ ¹ Æ, but |Q1|B^ 
∩ |Q2|B^ ∩ . . . ∩ |Qk|B^ ∩ |C| = Æ. In such a case, given B^, Q1, Q2, . . . , Qk do not commit 
the agent to betting on some proposition at different odds. But, given B^ and C, they do commit 
the agent to betting on some proposition at different odds. That is, any way of, given B^, 
resolving one’s uncertainty about the objects that are F1, F2, . . . , Fk, Q1, Q2, . . . , Qk commit the 
agent to betting on some proposition at odds different from those sanctioned as fair by some 
member of C. This completes the proof of Lemma 2. 
 We can finish our proof of the theorem by proving Lemma 1—that if A’s credal state 
violates Quantificational Consistency, then |Q1|B^ ∩ |Q2|B^ ∩ . . . ∩ |Qk|B^ ∩ |C| = Æ. 
Suppose that A’s credal state violates Quantificational Consistency. Then there is no complete 
extension of B^ and complete extension of C that satisfy each of Q1, Q2, . . . , Qk. We can 
represent this by saying: 
{<B+, C+>: B+ is a complete extension of B^, C+ is a complete extension of C, and <B+, 
C+> satisfies each of Q1, Q2, . . . , Qk} = Æ. 
Now what remains to be shown is that if this is true, then |Q1|B^ ∩ |Q2|B^ ∩ . . . ∩ |Qk|B^ ∩ 
|C| = Æ. Given the truth of the antecedent, we know the following: 
{<B+, C*>: B+ is a complete extension of B^, C* is totally decided, and <B+, C*> 
satisfies each of Q1, Q2, . . . , Qk} ∩ {<B, C+>: B is a set of beliefs and C+ is a complete 
extension of C} = Æ. 
This is because though the first set of pairs may include pairs the second member of which is a 
totally decided set of credences which is not a complete extension of C, the second set contains 
only pairs which have complete extensions of C as their second member. Now, the pairs of totally 
decided beliefs and totally decided credences that satisfy each of a set of quantificational 
credences are the pairs that satisfy the first quantificational credence and the second and the 
third, etc. So, we know the following: 
{<B+, C*>: B+ is a complete extension of B^, C* is totally decided, and <B+, C*> 
satisfies Q1} ∩ {<B+, C*>: B+ is a complete extension of B^, C* is totally decided, and 
<B+, C*> satisfies Q2} ∩ . . . ∩ {<B+, C*>: B+ is a complete extension of B^, C* is totally 
decided, and <B+, C*> satisfies Qk} ∩ {<B, C+>: B is a set of beliefs and C+ is a 
complete extension of C} = Æ. 
Remember our definition of satisfaction: Where q is any quantifier, we can say that a pair 
  
consisting of a totally decided set of beliefs, B, and a totally decided set of credences, C, satisfies a 
quantificational credence of strength n, for q of the Fs, that it is G if and only if for each of q of 
the objects believed to be F in B, x, C contains a credence of strength n that x is G. So, by 
explicitly substituting this in all but the final set, we have the following: 
{<B+, C*>: B+ is a complete extension of B^, C* is totally decided, and for each of q of 
the objects believed to be F1 in B+, x, C* contains a credence of strength n that x is G1} ∩ 
{<B+, C*>: B+ is a complete extension of B^, C* is totally decided, and for each of q of 
the objects believed to be F2 in B+, x, C* contains a credence of strength n that x is G2} ∩ 
. . . ∩ {<B+, C*>: B+ is a complete extension of B^, C* is totally decided, and for each of 
q of the objects believed to be Fk in B+, x, C* contains a credence of strength n that x is 
Gk} ∩ {<B, C+>: B is a set of beliefs and C+ is a complete extension of C} = Æ. 
Complete extensions of sets of beliefs and credences make them totally decided about all matters. 
But, the empty intersection of the sets just mentioned can only arise in virtue of beliefs and 
credences about objects which are, in the extensions, believed to be F1, F2, . . . , Fk. The sets place 
no constraints on beliefs and credences about other objects. So, an empty intersection results 
even if we simply look at extensions of B^ that are not complete but merely include beliefs about 
whether all objects are F1, F2, . . . , Fk. Thus, we know the following is true: 
{<B', C'>: B' is a set of beliefs about which objects are all and only the F1s, B^ ⊆ B', and, 
for q of the objects, x, believed in B' to be F1, there is a credence in C' of strength n that x 
is G1} ∩ {<B', C'>: B' is a set of beliefs about which objects are all and only the F2s, B^ 
⊆ B', and, for q of the objects, x, believed in B' to be F2, there is a credence in C' of 
strength n that x is G2} ∩ . . . ∩ {<B', C'>: B' is a set of beliefs about which objects are all 
and only the Fks, B^ ⊆ B', and, for q of the objects, x, believed in B' to be Fk, there is a 
credence in C' of strength n that x is Gk} ∩ {<B, C*>: B is a set of beliefs and C* is a 
complete extension of C} = Æ. 
Given our modeling assumptions, this is equivalent to: 
|Q1|B^ ∩ |Q2|B^ ∩ . . . ∩ |Qk|B^ ∩ |C| = Æ. 
Thus, we’ve shown that Lemma 1 is true—that if A’s credal state violates Quantificational 
Consistency, then |Q1|B^ ∩ |Q2|B^ ∩ . . . ∩ |Qk|B^ ∩ |C| = Æ. 
 We’ve thus proved our three Lemmas. The Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational 
Consistency follows from them by a couple of applications of hypothetical syllogism. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we have seen that for any agent violating Quantificational Consistency, 
there is a Dutch Book. That is, there is a sequence of bets that can be made that will guarantee 
the agent a loss. Thus, I’ve shown the following conditional conclusion: if Dutch Book Theorems 
do support epistemic norms, then we have support for Quantificational Consistency. 
 In addition to explicitly establishing the above conclusion, I hope to have also established 
another task. Dutch Book Theorems have been proved for a number of purported norms 
involving ordinary and conditional credences. We’ve seen that they can also be proved for our 
relative newcomer in the theory of credal states—quantificational credences. The fact that a 
Dutch Book Theorem involving quantificational credences can be proved provides more 
evidence for accepting quantificational credences into our credal ontology and as a topic for 
study in formal epistemology. Furthermore, the discussion of quantificational bets (in addition to 
being interesting in its own right) has shown how quantificational credences are distinctive sorts 
  
of credal attitudes. As we saw, they rationalize distinctive sorts of bets—and choices to act, in 
general—about which ordinary and conditional credences may be silent. In general, we’ve gotten 
a fuller picture of how quantificational credences fit into the landscape of credal attitudes. 
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